Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2018

When Old Meets New: Wholesale and Agency Models in the Market for
Printed and Electronic Books
Antino Kim
Kelley School of Business
Indiana University
antino@indiana.edu

Abstract
In this work, I seek explanations to some of the curious
phenomena reported in the book market by focusing on
its two important characteristics: (i) the substitutability
between the printed- and the e-book versions, and (ii) the
mixture of the “old” wholesaling arrangement for printedbook versions and the “new” agency model for e-book versions. In this exploration, using a game theoretic model,
I find that an increase in the agency fee that the retailer
collects in the e-book market can depress the vitality of
the market, which not only ends up hurting the publisher,
but also the retailer. This raises a caution that retailers
should be moderate in their efforts to get a bigger cut in
the agency arrangement. I also find that some of the perplexing phenomena observed in the real world may be due
to an excessively large agency fee in the e-book market,
and that reducing this fee can lead to a win-win outcome
for both the publisher and the retailer.
Keywords: Retailing, book, e-book, wholesale, agency,
revenue-sharing, substitutes, game theory.

1.

Introduction

Tug of war best describes the tension between
Amazon—an online retail giant with a huge presence in the book market—and some of the major
publishers—often referred to as the “Big Five”—in
deciding their retail arrangements for both printedand e-books. Traditionally, printed-books have been
sold through a wholesaling arrangement where a publisher first sells to a retailer at a wholesale price,
and the retailer then resells to consumers at a retail
price. Amazon wanted to extend this model to the ebook market to control the retail price of e-books as
well. The publishers, however, had something else in
mind; they wanted to adopt the agency model where
they get to decide on the final retail price and pay
a certain fraction of their revenue to the retailer as
an agency fee. In 2016, it seemed the publishers had
gotten their way; the publishers made Amazon agree
to
the agency model in the e-book market [14, 18].
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However, since this adoption of agency arrangement,
something puzzling has happened: the e-book market
has shrunken against the anticipation that it would
flourish and, in contrast, the printed-book market
has grown. Moreover, the e-book prices have gone
up whereas the printed-book prices have gone down,
and the publishers’ profits have decreased whereas
Amazon’s profit has increased [2, 12, 13]. Such outcomes are quite ironic considering how aggressively
the publishers have pushed to gain control over their
e-book price: Why could the publishers not benefit
from having more control over their e-book price?
Did the publishers overlook something while forcing Amazon to agree to the agency arrangement?
Mike Shatzkin—the founder and CEO of The Idea
Logical, a New York publishing consultancy—shares
something that raises a suspicion that the publishers
might not have fully understood the repercussions of
moving to the agency model in the e-book market.
He writes, “...four of the five big publishers think
agency has been a big mistake. As one observer sees
it, it has bled 25% out of digital sales that have been
replaced by physical, resulting in an increased share
for Amazon of the print portion of publishers’ businesses” [13]. In stark contrast, according to Shatzkin,
“Amazon is now happy with the fact that they have
no control over the final retail price of e-books” [12].
What can be gathered from the reports stated
above is the interconnected nature between the
printed- and the e-book markets. Specifically, in this
work, I focus on two defining market characteristics:
(i) printed books and e-books are partially substitutable, and (ii) e-books are now sold through the
agency model whereas printed books are still sold
through the wholesaling setup. I refer to this arrangement as the agency-mix, which is in contrast to the
previous pure-wholesaling setup where both products
are sold through the wholesaling arrangement. So,
in the overall book market, both the old Page
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wholesale and the new agency model clash, creating complications that some describe as a “threedimensional chess” [12]. In this work, I attempt to
delineate the dynamics between the publisher and
the retailer in the book market, and provide explanations to the perplexing real world phenomena
observed.
To that effort, I construct a parsimonious model
where the publisher sells its printed books through
the wholesaling arrangement with the retailer, and
sells the electronic version through the agency model.
This setup captures the essence of the market that,
for printed books, the retailer sets the final retail
price while, for e-books, the publisher sets the retail
price. From my analyses, I discover several interesting findings that are of managerial importance. First
of all, unlike what the conventional wisdom tells us,
the retailer’s profit in the e-book market is not monotonically increasing in the agency fee it collects in
the e-book market. This is because of the strategic
response from the publisher; as the retailer collects
more agency fee in the e-book market, the publisher
finds that market less attractive, and thus increases
the e-book price with the intention of nudging consumers to move to the printed-book market. Such a
reaction from the publisher may depress the e-book
market to a degree where the retailer actually loses
from charging a higher percentage as the agency fee.
Moreover, this loss in the e-book market can end up
hurting the retailer’s overall bottom line. This finding raises a caution that retailers should perhaps be
moderate in their efforts to get a larger cut of the
pie in the e-book market. I also discover that an
excessively high agency fee alone can account for the
perplexing phenomena observed in the market today.
Faced with two options—either to go back to purewholesaling or to reduce the agency fee while keeping
the agency-mix model—I find that the latter can lead
to a win-win outcome for both the publisher and the
retailer.

2.

Literature Review

This research relates to the growing list of literature that considers both the agency and wholesaling setups. For example, [9] explores the setting
with upstream competition between the manufacturers and identifies the cases where the retailer benefits
from external third party information concerning the
quality and the fit of the product. There, the authors
consider the wholesale case and the agency case in
separate settings.
[1] is one work that considers the coexistence of
both the wholesaling and the agency arrangement.

The authors examine to see when online retailers
should use agency selling over wholesaling based on
the severity of the competition among them and the
level of spillover effect to the traditional channel. The
authors find that agency selling leads to a more efficient outcome and that retailers would prefer agency
selling when electronic sales substitute the demand in
the traditional channel. They do not, however, consider a case where one retailer engages in both agency
selling and wholesaling.
The setup used in [19] is similar to the one used
in this paper in the sense that it also captures a
case where the retailer sells traditional goods through
wholesaling and digital goods through an agency
setup. While the model details differ, the authors
also find that the agency model might be preferred
to the traditional wholesaling setup by both the publisher and the retailer. However, they find that the
retailer can only do better with a higher agency fee,
which is in stark contrast with one of the main messages of this work. The key reason for this discrepancy is in the timing; in [19], the authors assume that
the e-book’s retail price is determined before that
of the printed version. However, since the publisher
has full control over the e-book’s retail price—and
the retailer over the printed-book’s retail price—it is
more reasonable to assume that the retail prices are
best response functions of each other. Hence, in this
work, I assume that the retail prices of both versions
are simultaneously determined.
[6] is another important part of the foundation this
work is built upon. There, the authors focus on the
complementary relationship between e-books and ereaders, and they identify this complementary relationship as the main reason for the low e-book prices
in the wholesale model. Compared to the wholesaling case, in the agency setting, the price for e-book
readers is lower, the price for e-books is higher, and
the publisher becomes worse off. Unlike the analyses
in this paper, they conduct the study with exogenous price for the printed books. At the core of
their results is the argument that the issue of double marginalization can be addressed by selling the
e-reader, as it essentially serve as a two-part tariff
mechanism. However, contents are becoming increasingly platform independent, thanks to platform virtualization. People can now read e-books on their
own devices through the use of apps. Based on this
reality, I do not consider platform aspects in my analyses. A natural consequence of this exclusion is that I
can immediately preclude any complementary effect
from the possible reasons for the findings.
The wholesale model has long been in used and
widely adopted in the retailing industry. Once a manufacturer sells its products to a retailer, itPage
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needs to keep track of them. From the retailer’s
point of view, once it purchases the product from
the manufacturer, it has the freedom to set whatever retail price to go with its overall market strategy. This convenience and flexibility are among the
main reasons for the popularity of the wholesaling
arrangement. However, that is not to say that such
an arrangement is without any problems. One of the
most well-known issues of wholesaling is the issue
of double-marginalization, which has long been recognized by economists [17]. When a monopolistic
manufacturer sells through a monopolistic retailer,
the vertical externality manifests itself as a higher
retail price, a lower demand, and a reduced channel profit. The resulting literature is so vast that
it is impossible to do justice in the short literature
review section of this work, and the interested reader
is referred to the excellent surveys in [3] and [7].
Among the many ideas that have been proposed to
address the issue of double-marginalization—such as
resale price maintenance, franchise fee, etc.—is the
idea of revenue-sharing agreements, which is at the
core of agency models [3, 11]. However, it has also
been demonstrated that revenue sharing may not be
a panacea for double marginalization. For instance, if
costly advertising becomes critical to boosting sales,
it can be shown that royalty payments based on a
revenue-sharing formula would not coordinate the
channel [4, 5]. Along the same line, this work also
shows that revenue-sharing arrangement does not
automatically translate to lower margins and a lower
retail price for e-books.

3.

Model and Analyses

Following the realities of the book market today, I
first consider the case where e-books are sold through
agency model and printed-books are sold through
wholesaling. For ease of reference, I refer to this mixture of wholesaling and agency model as agency-mix.
Later, in §5, I consider a case where both products
are sold through wholesaling, and I refer to that retail
setting as pure-wholesaling.
In the agency-mix model, the timeline of events
is as follows: First, the publisher sets the wholesale
price (wb ) of the printed-book version. Then, the
retailer sets the retail price (pb ) of the printed books,
and the publisher sets the price (pe ) of the e-books.
This sequence captures the fact that (i) the wholesale price is typically determined before the retail
prices are, and (ii) that the retail prices are relatively
more fluid compared to the wholesale price. Once
the retail-prices are set, the demand for each version
is formed based on the prices and the substitutability between the two versions. Following backward

induction, I describe the demand functions, and subsequently, the profit maximization problems of the
publisher and the retailer.

3.1.

Demand Functions

I assume that the two versions (i.e., printed- and ebook versions) are symmetric and differentiated, and
the consumers make a purchase decision based on (i)
the retail prices they see and (ii) the substitutability between the two. I adopt a commonly used linear
demand function that satisfies both of these assumptions [1, 8, 15, 16, 10]. The demands for printed- and
e-books—qb and qe , respectively—are:
σ
1
1
pb +
pe , and
(1)
−
qb =
2
1+σ 1−σ
1 − σ2
1
σ
1
qe =
pe +
pb ,
(2)
−
1 + σ 1 − σ2
1 − σ2
where pb and pe are retail prices of printed- and ebook versions, respectively, and 0 < σ < 1 represents
the level of substitutability between the two versions.
As it is obvious from the lack of any explicit
incentive compatibility constraints, I do not restrict
the consumers from purchasing both versions. For
instance, if the two products are substantially
different—and not highly substitutable—a consumer
who purchases the printed version may also purchase
the electronic version. Hence, the total demand is
b −pe
, which clearly shrinks as the two
qb + qe = 2−p
1+σ
versions become more substitutable. This is intuitive
since, when the two versions are highly substitutable,
consumers who purchase one version would be less
likely to consider also purchasing the other.1

3.2.

Publisher’s and Retailer’s
Decisions

Anticipating the demands, the publisher and the
retailer set the retail prices. The interesting aspect in
the agency-mix setting is that the retail price of each
version is set by a different party. For e-books, the
firms are in an agency arrangement, where the publisher directly controls the retail price (pe ) and, as an
agency fee, pays the retailer α ∈ (0, 1) fraction of the
retail price for each copy sold. For the printed-book
version, the firms engage in a wholesale agreement,
where the publisher sets the wholesale price (wb ) and
the retailer adds its margin to the wholesale price,
effectively setting the retail price, pb . This combination of agency and wholesale arrangements between
the publisher and the retailer is summarize in Figure 1.
1

As a side note, I have also considered different models in
which the total demand does not change with σ. For example,
I considered a case where qb = 1 − pb + σ(pe − pb ) and qe =
1 − pe + σ(pb − pe ), leading to a total market size of 2 − pb − pe .
However, the results do not change qualitatively.
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I now describe the equilibrium outcomes. First, solving qe = 0 for α with the optimal prices from (5),
(6), and (7), I obtain ᾱ above which the market for
e-book disappears:

Printed book: Wholesale

Publisher

E-book: Agency

wb

?
Retailer
pb

Keeps α
pe

?

1
(4+σ(3−σ(1+σ))−
Lemma 1. For α ≥ ᾱ= σ2 (1+
σ)
16+σ(24−σ(7+8σ(3+σ)))), the market for e-book
disappears.

p

?
Consumers

Figure 1. Publisher and Retailer Relationship

From the setting, the profits for the publisher and
the retailer—ΠH and ΠA ,2 respectively—can be written as:
ΠH = qb wb + (1 − α)qe pe , and
ΠA = qb (pb − wb ) + αqe pe .

(3)
(4)

Both firms set the retail prices—the publisher, pe ,
and the retailer, pb —to maximize their profits.
Simultaneously solving for the first-order conditions
wb−(1−pb )(1−α))σ
ΠA
ΠH
= 1−2pe (1−α)−α+(1−σ
= 0 and ddp
=
( ddp
2
e
b
1−2pb+wb−(1−pe (1+α))σ
=0) results in the following opti1−σ 2
mal retail prices:
2−(1+σ−3wb )σ−α(2−σ+(wb −σ)σ)
, and (5)
(1−α) (4−(1+α)σ 2 )
1
p∗b =
(1−α)(1−σ)(2+(1+α)σ)
(1−α) (4−(1+α)σ 2 ) 
+wb 2(1−α)+(1+α)σ 2 .
(6)
p∗e =

It is easy to verify that the second-order conditions
2
2(1−α)
d2 ΠA
2
( ddpΠeH
= − 1−σ
2 = − 1−σ 2 < 0 and
2 < 0) are also
dpb 2
satisfied.
Substituting the retail prices in (3) and (4) with
(5) and (6), I get the profits as functions of wb . To
find the optimal wb the publisher chooses in the first
stage, I once again examine the first-order condition:
(1−α)(8(1−ασ )+(1+α)2 σ 3 )−2wb (8(1−α)+(1+α)2 σ 2 )
dΠH
=
= 0.
dwb
(1−α)(4−(1+α)σ 2 )2
This leads to the following expression for the wholesale price of the printed-book version:
wb∗ =

(1−α) (8(1−ασ)+(1+α)2 σ 3 )
.
16(1−α)+2(1+α)2 σ 2

Here as well, the second-order condition (
−α)+2(1+α)2 σ 2
− 16(1
(1−α)(4−(1+α)σ 2 )2

2

Equilibrium and Results

The above lemma shows that when α is excessively
large—that is, when the retailer sets out to collect
too much from e-book sales—the e-book market ultimately collapses. Intuitively as well, when α grows
excessively high, leaving the publisher close to nothing for e-book sales, the e-book market will become
less and less attractive to the publisher, who responds
strategically to the change in α. Later, in the comparative statics, I describe in detail how the players
respond to the change in dynamics as represented by
α and how the equilibrium changes accordingly.
As the primary interest of this work is in the equilibrium regions where both the printed books and
e-books are sold, hereafter, unless stated otherwise,
all results are for the range where α < ᾱ. Within that
range, the optimal profits for the publisher and the
retailer are denoted as Π∗H and Π∗A , respectively.3 For
completeness, note that the profits for α ≥ ᾱ can be
obtained by simply replacing α with ᾱ in the profit
expressions; since the e-book market disappears for
α ≥ ᾱ, the change in α does not affect the profits in
that range.
Let us now examine the profit expressions closely.
Intuitively, the publisher ought to always desire a
lower α while the retailer should prefer the exact
opposite [19]. The question then arises, does that
simple intuition extend to my setup?
First, from the above profit expressions, I can infer
a divergence between the incentives of the publisher
and the retailer. Intuitively, the publisher always
prefers to pay a lower agency fee, that is, the publisher’s profit (Π∗H ) strictly decreases in α. This is
because as the publisher forks over a larger portion
of the profit from the e-book sales to the retailer,
3

(7)
d2 ΠH
dwb 2

=

<0) is satisfied.

As a mnemonic, I suggest that the readers associate the subscript H with HarperCollins Publishers—one of the world’s
largest publishing companies—and A with Amazon.

For interested readers, the detailed profit expressions are as
follows:
(1−α) (4(3+σ)−(1+σ) (8α−σ 2 (1+α)2 ))
, and
4(1+σ) (8(1−α)+σ 2 (1+α)2 )
1
Π∗A =
4(1+σ) (8(1−α)+σ 2 (1+α)2 )2
(16(1−α)2 ((1+4α)−σ(1−4α))

+4σ 2 (1+α) 4−α 1+α+4α2
3
−4σ (1+α)(4−α(9+α(1−4α)))
+σ 4 (1+α)3 (4(1−σ)+α(1+α)(1+σ))).

Π∗H =
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its overall profit decreases. On the other hand, the
retailer generally prefers a higher agency fee but not
always since Π∗A may actually decrease in α; for the
retailer, it turns out, the situation is a little more
complex than what the common intuition might suggest. I formally summarize this profit observation as
the first proposition:
Proposition 1 (Total Profit). The publisher’s
profit (Π∗H ) strictly decreases in α. However, the
retailer’s profit (Π∗A ) may be non-monotonic in α.
Specifically, when σ ≥ σ̂, where σ̂≈0.697, Π∗A strictly
increases in α. However, when σ < σ̂, Π∗A increases
in α until α̂ and decreases, where α̂ is the unique
root for 512(1+σ)(1−α)3+64σ 2 (5+3α (α3 −2(1+α)))+
64σ 3 (1+3α (α3 +2(1−α))) + 4(1 + α)2 σ 4 (29 − 17σ −
α(α(5+7σ +6α(1+σ))−6(1+σ)))+(1+α)4 σ 6 (5σ +
α(2+α)(1+σ)−3)=0 within 0 < α < 1.
Thus, beyond a certain threshold, increasing α can
be a losing proposition, both for the publisher and
the retailer. This finding is in clear contradiction not
only to the common intuition but also to the suggestions from prior literature. For instance, [19] demonstrates that the retailer with a higher negotiating
power would always opt for a higher α. In contrast,
the above proposition implies that even when the
retailer’s bargaining power is great enough to command a large α, it may be in the retailer’s best interest not to; it might be a better strategic move to
yield more to the publisher.
I now examine the e-book market and the printedbook market separately by taking a closer look at
the partial profits from each market.4 Hereafter,
all expressions for printed- and e-book markets are
marked by subscripts b and e, respectively.5 Once
again, the partial profits for the region where α ≥ ᾱ
can be obtained by simply replacing α with ᾱ in the
4

Note that these are not optimal values since the players optimize their total profits not their partial ones.
5

For interested readers, the detailed partial profit expressions
are as follows:
(1−α) (8(1−ασ)+(1+α)2 σ 3 ) (2+σ 2−α (2−σ 2 ))
,
2(1+σ) (8(1−α)+(1+α)2 σ 2 )2
1
(1−α) (8(1−α)+
ΠHe =
2 σ 2 )2
4(1+σ) (8(1−α)+(1+α)

2
2
2(1+α)σ−(1−α
)σ 8(1−α)+(2−6α)σ+(1+α)2σ 2

+(1+α)2 σ 3 ,
1
ΠAb =
2(1+σ) (8(1−α)+(1+α)2 σ 2 )2

2
4(1−α)(1−σ(1−2α))+2σ
(1+α)2−σ 3 (2−α)(1+α)2

2
2
2+σ −α 2−σ , and
1
α(8(1−α)+2σ(1+α)
ΠAe =
2 σ 2 )2
4(1+σ)(8(1−α)+(1+α)


2
2
−σ 1−α
8(1−α)+2σ(1−3α)+σ 2 (1+α)2 (1+σ) .
ΠHb =

partial profit expressions. Obviously, when α ≥ ᾱ, the
e-book market collapses, so ΠHe =0 and ΠAe =0.
First off, I see that the change in α not only
affects the equilibrium outcomes in the e-book market but also those in the printed-book market.
Though α is the agency-fee percentage within the ebook market—and hence an important indicator of
the dynamics between the players in that market—
curiously, it appears to have a spill-over effect in
the printed-book market as well. Specifically, the
profit for the publisher from the printed-book market
decreases with α whereas that for the retailer strictly
increases.
As is the case with the total profit, the publisher’s
partial profit from the e-book market falls with α
as the publisher yields a larger fraction of the revenue from the e-book market to the retailer. So,
it seems that, as α increases, the publisher bleeds
in both markets whereas the retailer always benefits in the printed-book market and may also benefit in the e-book market—provided that α is not
excessively high. Once again, beyond a threshold, the
retailer’s profit from the e-book market diminishes.
This thusly shows that the conventional wisdom that
a higher agency fee would always benefit the retailer
does not necessarily hold even within just the e-book
market. I summarize these findings formally in the
next proposition:
Proposition 2 (Partial Profit). In the printedbook market, the profit of the publisher strictly
decreases in α whereas that of the retailer strictly
increases. In the e-book market, the profit of the
publisher strictly decreases in α whereas that of
the retailer may be non-monotonic in α. Specifically, when σ ≥ σ̌, where σ̌ ≈ 0.917, ΠAe strictly
increases in α. However, when σ < σ̌, ΠAe increases
in α until α̌ and decreases, where α̌ is the
unique root for 32(3 + α(α(α(6α − 1) − 9) − 7))σ 2 +
32 (3+6α−6α3 +5α4 ) σ 3 + 256(1 − α)3 (2 + σ) + (1 +
α)2 σ 4 (12−4α(α(7 + 6α)−14)+8ασ(α(1−3α) − 2)+
σ 2 (1 + α)4 − σ 3 (1 + α)2 (1 − α(2 + α))) = 0 within
0 < α < 1.
Proposition 2, together with Proposition 1, conveys
a clear message for the retailer. Though it may be
tempting for the retailer to always push for a higher
α, it might not be in the retailer’s best interest to do
so. Above a certain threshold, the profit from the ebook market may actually decrease in α, ultimately
reducing the total profit for the retailer. A retailer
blindly following the common intuition and the suggestions from prior literature may always fight for a
higher α, which may be suboptimal for the
retailer.
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The proposition also carries a message for the publisher, though the message is a little more subtle than
the one for the retailer. As one may expect, the publisher loses as α increases. The more nuanced point
is that the reduction in the publisher’s profit is due
to the fact that the publisher loses in both markets.
As α increases, its primary effect on ΠHe is easy to
predict. However, the secondary effect on ΠHb may
not be as so; a bigger α reduces not only ΠHe but
also ΠHb . With this new finding, now, the publisher
has an added incentive to push for a lower α. Only
focusing on the impact of agency fee in the e-book
market may lead to neglecting other possible negatives on the publisher’s overall profit, leading to an
underestimation of the impact of rising α.
All profit-related results presented so far are direct
consequences of the publisher’s and the retailer’s
pricing decisions. To better understand the driving
forces behind these findings, let us now take a closer
look at the strategies of the players represented by
their optimal prices:
σ
2((1−α)(1−σ))
p∗b =1− −
, and
2 8(1−α)+σ 2 (1+α)2
2
8(1−α)+2σ(1+α)−σ (1−α2 )
.
p∗e =
16(1−α)+2σ 2 (1+α)2

(8)
(9)

With these price expressions—which capture the
strategies of the publisher and the retailer—the
strategic interaction between the two players starts
to unfold. First, when α increases—which generally represents a higher bargaining power of the
retailer, or, conversely, a weaker position of ∗the
dp
publisher—the price of e-book rises, that is, dαe =
(1−σ )σ (16−(1+α)2 σ 2 )
> 0. This is in contradiction with
(8(1−α)+(1+α)2 σ 2 )2
the notion that p∗e , which is set by the publisher, represents the power of the publisher; it may be tempting to think that any given price represents the pricing power of the party that sets the price. However,
directly contradicting that view, when the retailer is
able to push for a higher cut in the e-book market,
I see here that the publisher sets a higher p∗e . This
finding demonstrates that, though the “Big Five”
attempted to gain autonomy from Amazon’s grip in
the e-book market by being able to set the prices
themselves, their pricing decisions may be closely
tied to their relative bargaining power and tied in a
way that may not be immediately intuitive.
As shown in Proposition 2, the effect of α is not
confined to the profits in the e-book market and
has a spill-over effect on the profits in the printedbook market as well. Similarly, here, I observe that
an increase in α raises not only the e-book price
dp∗
but also the printed-book price. That is, dαb =

2(3−α)(1+α)(1−σ )σ 2
(8(1−α)+(1+α)2 σ 2 )2

> 0. To understand the logic behind
the mechanism observed here, it is crucial to keep
in mind that p∗b is set by the retailer while p∗e is
set by the publisher. When the publisher needs to
fork over a bigger fraction of the earning from each
e-book sold, it finds the e-book market less desirable. Because of the substitutability between the two
products, the publisher can raise the e-book price
in order to nudge the consumers to migrate from
the less desirable e-book market to the printed-book
market. However, when the publisher increases p∗e ,
the retailer finds itself in a position where it can also
raise p∗b since the price of the competing product has
increased. As a result, with increasing α, I find that
both the e-book and the printed-book prices rise.
I now analyze how the demand responds to the
players’ pricing strategies:
2+σ 2 −α (2−σ 2 )
, and
(1+σ) (8(1−α)+σ 2 (1+α)2 )
8(1−α)+2(1−3α)σ+σ 2 (1+α)2 (1+σ)
.
qe =
2(1+σ) (8(1−α)+σ 2 (1+α)2 )
qb =

The above demand expressions reveal something
interesting. Based on the basic intuition, since the
retail prices increase as α increases, all else equal,
the demands ought to decrease with α. Additionally, it appears that the simple intuition holds
as far as the e-book market is concerned; the
e
demand for e-books decreases as α increases ( dq
=
dα
16σ−σ 3 (7−α)(1+α)
− (1+σ)(8(1−α)+σ2 (1+α)2 )2 < 0). However, as soon as I
turn to the printed-book market, this simple intuition does not apply. Though p∗b also increases
b
as α increases, qb actually increases in α ( dq
=
dα
2
4
2
2(5−α(2−α))σ −σ (1+α)
> 0), implying that the demand
(1+σ )(8(1−α)+σ 2 (1+α)2 )2
for the printed-books increases as the price increases.
Upon a closer observation, I find that, as α increases,
the publisher raises p∗e a lot more aggressively comdp∗
pared to how the retailer raises p∗b , that is, dαe >
∗
dpb
. Because of this difference in the rate in which
dα
∗
pb and p∗e increase with α, more consumers find the
printed version to be relatively more desirable than
the electronic version. As a result, the number of
consumers choosing printed-books over e-books is
greater than the number of consumers who forgo purchasing because of the high price. I summarize these
observations below:
Proposition 3 (Price and Demand). As α increases, both p∗e and p∗b increase, but p∗e increases∗ at
dp
dp∗
a steeper rate compared to p∗b . That is, dαe > dαb >
0. Because of this difference in the rates, while both
prices increase with α, only qe decreases whereas qb
e
b
increases. That is, dq
< 0 and dq
> 0. Page 5179
dα
dα

With Proposition 3, now, the complete picture
starts to unravel. As the publisher needs to fork
over a bigger fraction of the profit from the e-book
sales, the e-book market becomes less attractive to
the publisher. Accordingly, the publisher raises the
e-book price to push the consumers to the printed
version instead. However, the increase in the e-book
price allows the retailer to raise the printed-book
price as well; the retailer just does so not as aggressively as the publisher raises the e-book price, which
results in an increase in the printed-book demand
and a decrease in the e-book demand. When α
increases too much, the publisher, for all practical
purposes, abandons the e-book market and raises pe
rapidly. When that happens, the gain in the printedbook market may not enough to compensate for the
loss in the e-book market for the retailer, and the
total profit for the retailer would decrease. At an
extreme value of α—beyond ᾱ—the e-book market
essentially collapses, leading to a market where only
printed books are traded.
There is now one remaining venue for investigation;
why would the retailer increase p∗b less aggressively
compared to how the publisher increases p∗e ? It is
understandable that the publisher would desire this
to happen so that it can effectively move consumers
from purchasing e-books to printed-books. However,
it is not clear what incentive the retailer has to hold
back from increasing the printed-book price more
aggressively. Let us now visit this last missing piece
of the puzzle. Since the marginal cost is negligible,
the wholesale price wb is the publisher’s margin on
the printed books, and mb = pb −wb is the retailer’s
margin for each copy sold. Additionally, for e-books,
I can calculate how much margin each player gains
per copy sold. For the publisher, the margin on each
e-book is we =(1−α)pe , and for the retailer, me =αpe .
Proposition 4 (Margins). For both printedand e-books, the publisher’s margins decrease with
α
dw∗
while the retailer’s margins increase. That is, dαb <
∗
dm∗
dw∗
e
0, dαb > 0, dαe < 0, and dm
> 0.
dα
What Proposition 4 shows is that, for the retailer,
α can be a device to nudge the publisher to lower the
wholesale price of the printed books. This intricate
relationship of how α—a parameter directly relevant
to the e-book market—can serve as a strategic apparatus for the retailer in forcing the publisher to lower
the wholesale price in the printed-book market has
not been identified in prior literature.
I now illustrate the whole mechanism behind the
results: Suppose that α has increased by ∆. Then,
the publisher would find the formerly optimal prices
to be no longer optimal now that α has changed.

Accordingly, the publisher explores to see if it could
do anything to improve its status by changing pe and
wb , its strategic levers. Since the e-book market is
now less attractive, the publisher has an incentive to
migrate consumers away from the e-book market and
towards the printed-book market. With that in mind,
the publisher increases pe , expecting a compensation
from the printed-book market to make up for the loss
in the e-book market. However, in the printed-book
market, it is not the publisher that sets the retail
price, pb ; it is the retailer. And, this retailer has two
reasons to increase pb : First, because of the increased
α, the e-book market is now more attractive to the
retailer, and second, as the publisher increases pe —
the price of the competing good—the retailer can also
afford to increase pb without significantly hurting the
demand for the printed-book version. Anticipating
this incentive of the retailer, the publisher sets wb
in a way that it becomes suboptimal for the retailer
to increase pb to a point where it would cancel out
all the gains that the publisher expects from raising
pe . By decreasing wb , the publisher is able to achieve
exactly that; the publisher hands out an extra premium to the retailer, and this extra premium in the
printed-book market takes away some of the relative
appeal of the e-book market. As a result, the retailer
does not raise pb as high as it would have had otherwise.

5.

Comparison with
“Pure-Wholesaling”

As discussed in §1, the publishers had to pressure
Amazon into signing the agency agreement. The
rational was simple; the emerging e-book market
seemed promising, and the publishers wanted to be
able to directly control the retail price instead of
being under the control of Amazon’s pricing decisions. Despite this simple sentiment, according to
the reports, the outcomes seem to have gone in the
opposite direction of what the publishers had hoped.
The demand for e-books fell sharply, and the publishers’ revenues have noticeably dropped. On the
contrary, the demand for printed-books rose substantially, and Amazon—who initially resisted the
agency-mix arrangement—actually gained from the
transition. In this section, I seek explanations behind
this puzzling outcome.
To understand what happened in the transition
from the pure-wholesaling model to the agency-mix
arrangement, a benchmark model that represents the
pure-wholesaling model is needed. To make a fair
comparison, I use the same demand specification as
written in (1) and (2). The difference is inPage
the profit
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expressions due to the different retailing arrangement; the profit expressions change from (3) and (4)
to the following:
ΠHω = qbω wbω + qeω weω , and
ΠAω = qbω (pbω − wbω ) + qeω (peω − weω ),

(10)
(11)

where ω is added as a suffix to represent the
pure-wholesaling arrangement. Similar to what was
assumed earlier in §3, the wholesale prices are determined first by the publisher, and then the retail
prices are set by the retailer. By backward induction,
I solve for the retailer’s pricing problem first and the
publisher’s pricing problem second. Solving for the
Πrω
rω
first-order conditions ( ddp
= 0 and ddpΠeω
= 0) simulbω
1+wbω
∗
taneously, I obtain pbω = 2
and p∗eω = 1+2weω .
I also check the Hessian matrix to verify that the
second-order conditions are satisfied, confirming that
these prices are indeed the optimal prices for the
retailer.
Anticipating such a response from the retailer, the
publisher decides on the wholesale prices. After substituting the retail prices in the publisher’s profit
expression for the optimal prices obtained above,
once again, I leverage the first-order conditions
ΠHω
ΠHω
( ddw
= 0 and ddw
= 0) and Hessian matrix to
eω
bω
obtain the optimal wholesale prices for the publisher.
As before, the equilibrium outcomes for the printedand e-books are marked by subscripts b and e, respectively, with ω added as a suffix to represent the purewholesaling arrangement:
1
3
1
wbω ∗ =weω ∗ = , pbω ∗ =p∗eω = , qbω =qeω =
,
2
4
4(1+σ)
1
1
, ΠAbω ∗ =ΠAeω ∗ =
.
ΠHbω ∗ =ΠHeω ∗ =
8(1+σ)
16(1+σ)
As can be seen, in equilibrium, the prices—wholesale
and retail—of each market are independent of their
counterparts in the other market. In other words,
the level of substitutability σ plays little role in the
optimal prices, and the prices become what one can
expect from any ordinary wholesaling model.6 That
is because, in this pure-wholesaling model, though
the two products are substitutable, there is no competition between the publisher and the retailer since
the retailer sets both prices.
Moving forward, I aim to find an explanation for
the current state of affairs in the book industry.
According to the reports, after moving from purewholesaling to agency-mix, (i) publishers’ profit has
decreased whereas Amazon’s profit has increased, (ii)
6

From a simple model with linear demand, the wholesale price
is 12 and the retail price, 43 [cf. 20, p. 175].

the e-book price has gone up whereas the printedbook price has gone down, and (iii) the demand for
e-books has decreased whereas that for the printedbook has increased. In light of this reality, naturally, my curiosity is whether such a situation can
be found in the comparison. Reassuringly, such an
outcome is indeed possible when α is excessively
high. For instance, when σ = 0.25 and α = 0.9,
it is clear that Π∗H (≈ 0.084) < Π∗Hω (= 0.2), ΠA ∗ (≈
0.174) > Π∗Aω (= 0.1), pe ∗ (≈ 0.847) > p∗eω (= 0.75),
pb ∗ (≈ 0.729) < pbω ∗ (= 0.75), qe (≈ 0.091) < qeω (=
0.2), and qb (≈ 0.249) > qbω (= 0.2):
Remark 1 (Reality Check). There is a region
where Π∗H < Π∗Hω , ΠA ∗ > Π∗Aω , pe ∗ > p∗eω , pb ∗ < pbω ∗ ,
qe < qeω , and qb > qbω , faithfully reflecting the realities of today.
What may be surprising is that pe ∗ can be higher
than p∗eω ; it is commonly accepted that revenuesharing, in a parsimonious setting, eliminates the
issue of double marginalization. By parsimonious,
I mean no other retail channel via which a close
substitute is sold. I bring in exactly those aspects
and demonstrate that, when the agency fee is high,
the retail price can increase even beyond the one
plagued by double marginalization. Once again, this
is because, as the agency fee increases, the e-book
market becomes less attractive to the publisher, and
the desire for the publisher to nudge consumers to
the printed-book version increases.
Interestingly, the case highlighted in the above
∗
, where
remark cannot occur for α values below αA
∗
αA is:
(
α̂, if σ < σ̂,
∗
αA =
1, otherwise.
∗
Basically, αA
is the threshold for α below which the
retailer’s profit monotonically increases with α in
the agency-mix setting. This discovery hints at the
possibility that, perhaps, the agency fee that Amazon is charging the “Big Five” publishers is suboptimal for both parties. This once again illustrates the
importance of Proposition 1 as Amazon may actually be leaving money on the table. However, even
if the retailer was aware of the results in Proposi∗
tion 1—and made sure it did not push α beyond αA
even when its negotiating power afforded it to—the
publisher may still be worse off in the agency-mix
setup. In a situation described in Remark 1, the publisher and the retailer have two options: Either (i) go
back to the pure-wholesaling model, or (ii) reduce the
agency fee. Is there a range for α where both parties
can be better off in the agency-mix setting compared
to the pure-wholesaling? I present my findings
below:
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Proposition 5 (Profit Comparison). For α<
αHω , the publisher would prefer the agency-mix but
would prefer the pure-wholesaling for α beyond αHω ,
where αHω is the unique real root for Π∗H = Π∗Hω for
∗
0 < α < 1. For αAω <α<αA
, the retailer would prefer
the agency-mix but would prefer the pure-wholesaling
for α below αAω , where αAω is the unique real root for
∗
Π∗A = Π∗Aω for 0 < α < αA
. Comparing the thresholds,
∗
I find that αAω < αHω < αA
.
From Proposition 5, I can infer several important
∗
messages. Since αHω < αA
, if the retailer had a substantial bargaining power to set α above αHω , the
publisher would always be worse off in the agencymix model compared to the pure-wholesaling model.
At the other end, when α is too low—below αAω —
while the publisher would come out ahead with the
agency-mix model, the retailer would not. This is
probably what the “Big Five” publishers were hoping
for and what Amazon was afraid of when they were
considering transitioning from the pure-wholesaling
setup to the agency-mix model. That explains why
the publishers were so eager to move to the new
retailing arrangement whereas Amazon was obviously reluctant.
As already seen from Proposition 1, generally, the
retailer fares better with higher α whereas the situation is the opposite for the publisher. Hence, it should
come as little surprise that the two players generally disagree in terms of the ideal value for α. What
Proposition 5 reveals is an extension of Proposition 1;
not only do the players disagree in their desired levels of α, they also disagree in when they prefer the
agency-mix arrangement over the pure-wholesaling
model.
Though this finding may initially appear bleak,
not all hope is lost. Interestingly, I find that there
is a region where agency-mix can be a “win-win”
proposition for both the publisher and the retailer
compared to the pure-wholesaling setup. For αAω <
α < αHω , the agency-mix would be a better proposition for both the publisher and the retailer compared
to the pure-wholesaling. This finding has an obvious
implication. Though the retailer and the publisher
would strive to pull α in their own desirable direction,
it is clear that agency-mix is the arrangement they
can both agree on, and an α value between αAω and
αHω —not too high and not too low—is the range in
which the agreement can happen. If any higher than
αHω , the publisher will want to defect to the purewholesaling instead, and if lower than αAω , this time,
the retailer would push back against the agency-mix
arrangement.
Given the current situation, the publishers might
have the urge to revert back to pure-wholesaling. In

fact, there are some statements about the publishers’
remorse from moving to the agency-mix model [13].
However, according to the findings of this work, that
would be a rash knee-jerk reaction as the publishers can gain from the current agency-mix setting.
My result shows that there is no region where purewholesaling is a win-win proposition for both parties;
only agency-mix can provide that. Though there is a
clear divergence in the incentives between the publisher and the retailer in setting the value of α, my
result can bring both parties to the negotiating table
and ultimately encourage them to reach a win-win
outcome.

6.

Discussion and Conclusion

With the advent of e-books, also came the opportunity to experiment with a more innovative retailing
arrangement as opposed to simply adopting the traditional wholesale model used to sell printed-books.
As e-books are ordered and delivered digitally, the
agency setup appears to be a suitable choice for the
product; a publisher can directly monitor—using the
retailer’s platform—how many copies of e-books are
being sold and how much of the total revenue it gets.
The agency model has another appeal to publishers: Unlike the wholesaling setup, the publishers can
directly control the final retail price of the e-books
in the agency model. As the expectation for the ebook market ballooned, and as the publishers grew
disgruntled with Amazon’s pricing of e-books, the
“Big-Five” publishers fought for the agency model
for e-books, and the sentiment was that they had won
the battle. It appears, however, that they may have
lost the war; see the following report that describes
the current state of affair:
“Revenue is down in e-books because Amazon,
using their mercantile might, has been aggressively
selling printed-backs and hardbacks after publishers
took away their power to control e-book pricing. Now
e-book prices are way up and print prices are way
down, a situation that eats into the publishers physical distribution models and guts their e-book sales.
Book pundits all over the web are blaming Amazon for its habit of aggressively pricing hardbacks
and printed-backs after losing control of e-book pricing” [2].
Both perplexed and intrigued by such an outcome,
in this work, I take a closer look at the relationship
between a publisher and a retailer to untangle the
mysteries behind what is observed in the printed- and
e-book markets. First, I examine how the change in
the agency fee in the e-book market influences the
pricing strategies and the profits of the players.
In
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this effort, I discover that, despite the common belief,
the retailer does not always make a higher profit as
it attempts to extract more from each e-book sold.
It turns out that, as the agency fee increases, the
publisher loses in both the printed- and e-book markets, and the retailer gains in both markets up to
a certain level, beyond which the retailer may lose
in the e-book market. This loss in the e-book market can more than offset the gain in the printedbook market, leading to the non-monotonicity in
the retailer’s total profit. I also find that, as the
agency fee increases, the e-book demand decreases
while the printed-book demand rises, even though
the prices for both increase. Moreover, increasing
the agency fee in the e-book market also puts the
retailer in an advantageous position in the printedbook market, where the retailer can nudge the publisher to offer a lower wholesale price on the printed
books. To the best of my knowledge, this work is
the first to identify how the changes in the agency
fee has a crossover influence on the publisher’s margin in the printed-book market. Finally, I discover
that Amazon may be collecting a sub-optimally high
agency fee in the e-book market, leading to the odd
outcomes highlighted in the quote above. Overall,
I find that somewhat puzzling outcomes can occur
because of how the two key factors—substitutability
between the two products and the mixture of two
retail arrangements—considered in this model manifest themselves in the equilibrium.
Despite the current high e-book prices and low
demand, some remain optimistic, saying that “when
e-book pricing returns to sanity, expect to see a lot
more revenue from digital channels” [2]. However,
according to the findings of this work, the high ebook prices may be a direct byproduct of the market
structure, and the “sanity” may not be restored automatically without the efforts from both the publisher
and the retailer. Still, that is not to say that all hope
is lost with the agency-mix model. The good news is
that there is a win-win region where both the publisher and the retailer are better off with the agencymix setting. In fact, the pure-wholesaling arrangement can never be a win-win proposition. Thus, my
results would assist the publisher and the retailer to
see eye to eye in their negotiation endeavor and to
converge on a retailing configuration.
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